Finally, the reservation to Article 100(5) empowers the High Court to decide on the appeal on “any other question of substantive law” which it did not raise at the time of admission, provided that it is satisfied that such a question exists on the merits and gives reasons. This power was conferred on the High Courts in order to protect the litigant from the injustice resulting from the fact that the courts did not frame such questions incorrectly or inadvertently when admitting the appeal. “Just as this court has always disapproved of the practice of dismissing a second appeal with a non-speech order stating only that the case did not raise a substantive point of law, the High Court cannot allow a second appeal without discussing the question of law, which the High Court did. As already mentioned, the existence of a question of law on the merits is a sine qua non condition for the court to exercise its power under Section 100 ZPO (second appeal).  An essential question of fact and law was considered to have arisen in this case. The court found that the defendant-plaintiff had no reason to use the disputed territory to enter and exit because of a right of servitude or even by way of “easement”. There was no indication that the side door of the respondent`s house was constructed with the consent of the municipal administration. In order to explain the scope of Article 100 CCP, the court stated that a second appeal or, in this regard, an appeal is not a question of law. The right of appeal is enshrined in law.
A second appeal concerns only a question of law on the merits. If the law provides for a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot extend the scope of the appeal. 1. Any inference drawn from the content or wording of a document is a question of fact, whereas the legal effects of the same concept and the wording of the same document, applied to principles of law, are all related to the point of law. Therefore, if there is a misexplanation, interpretation or misapplication of the law, a question of law arises. As stated above, the right to a second complaint is a legal right and the conditions set out in Article 100 must be met to exercise this right. Consequently, the applicant is not entitled to bring a second appeal to the High Court, since the notice of appeal does not contain any specific substantive law. In 1976, section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended, limiting the jurisdiction of the High Court over second appeals. Even before the amendment, the First Court of Appeal was the last court of factual jurisdiction. The proposition that reciprocal commitments are sufficient to lead to the conclusion of a contract is well regulated and even elementary.
However, it does not appear that the High Court was asked to consider whether this proposal, in its application, was of a substantial nature between the parties to the case. The appeal was on a point of law. This issue directly and substantially affected the rights of the parties. It must be assumed that the High Court regarded the issue as a fundamental issue between the parties. We do not think it is appropriate to criticise the judgment for this reason, although this point would have been highly controversial had it been raised in the High Court. In any event, according to the second argument, that point loses its substance. The Court relied on Pankajakshi v. Chandrika, (2016) 6 SCC 157, which concluded that the provisions of the Punjab Courts Act 1918 allowing for the filing of regular second appeals were effective despite the restrictive conditions subsequently introduced by the amendment of Article 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1976. Consequently, the requirement to formulate a question of law on the merits was no longer a sine qua non condition for this Court to rule on a second ordinary action. In Hero Vinoth v.
Seshammal, in considering article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterated the test set out in Chunilal and defined the word “substantial” as “substantial”. material, real, of solid, substantial or substantial value.” The term “point of law” is qualified by the term “substantial”, which indicates that the mere existence of a question of law would not satisfy the requirements of section 100. Rather, it must be a fundamental issue that raises a rather contentious question of law that is not previously governed by specific legal provisions or principles deriving from binding precedents and that must also substantially affect the rights of the parties to the case. Supreme Court: Justices L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta* and Ajay Rastogi, composed of 3 members, held that the High Court is not bound to make substantive points of law unless it finds an error in the findings of the First Court of Appeal. 7. The first part of the argument, namely the total absence of a point of law, cannot be accepted. The receipt dated 5.3.1978, relied on by the defendants, contained a recital that a cheque for Rs. 18,000 mentioned therein was to be used as rent for the premises for the 12-month period up to 5 March. It was published in March 1978. The Rent Controller and the Tribunal erred in finding that the mere fact that the cheque had been demonstrably returned removed the consideration from the lease. Those authorities wrongly interpreted the non-payment of rent as constituting in fact the absence of consideration from a legal point of view.
This was clearly false. The determination of the rent alone is sufficient to conclude a lease in which, of course, the other element of exclusivity of possession is demonstrated. The High Court held that promised consideration was as valid as consideration paid and that, therefore, returning the cheque would not affect the legal consequence of the rent payment clause implied in Annex DW 1/3. The High Court interpreted the receipt and concluded that a lease was provided. The development of a document that forms the basis of the parties` rights raises a question of law. A finding of admitted or established facts is a question of law if such a conclusion is to be drawn from the application of appropriate legal principles to the facts. Such a conclusion is a question of mixed fact and law. We cannot accept Sri Sachhar`s assertion that the Supreme Court acted on the basis of prohibited facts. But Sri Sachar`s other argument is that it was certainly not a “substantive” question of law.
We might as well look into that. A key question of law also arises where the lower court exercises jurisdiction that does not belong to it by law; or records a conclusion without documentary evidence; or does not consider relevant or admissible evidence; or considers evidence irrelevant or inadmissible; or a poorly constructed document that is essential to the case; or places the burden of proof on the wrong party. In addition, the Court held that, despite the correct application of the principle of law established by the lower court, an essential question of law would arise if the appellant could satisfy the High Court that the legal situation expressed should be reviewed, altered, amended or clarified or that a manifest conflict between two views should be resolved. whether this appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(u) CCP is to be heard to the same standard as a second appeal under Section 100 ZPO. Another key issue that arose was whether, when considering and deciding on various appeals under Order 43, Rule 1(u) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the applicant is required to propose the substantive issue and whether the Court is required to raise such a question under Art.