We now turn to comparative statics, how elitist-optimal levels of production and equality before the law vary according to the parameters. In the next section, we illustrate our most important static comparison results with some historical examples. For example, suppose |$f_{N}=f_{E}=f$|. Then, an increase in the size of the elite, |$alpha$|, leads to an increase in the efforts of elite agents and an increase in equality before the law. Formally, |$y^{{ED}}$|, |$y^{{EL}}$|and |$rho ^{ast }$| in |$alpha$|. If the solutions are inside, then the comparative static is strict. Elite agents can also be heterogeneous in terms of position in the political or legal hierarchy, which we can model as heterogeneity in its susceptibility to coercion. Again, suppose there are two elite groups, now corresponding to smaller elites (e.g., barons) and larger, more powerful elites (e.g., dukes) that are equally productive but differ in their susceptibility to coercion. In particular, let us assume that in the absence of equality before the law, ordinary agents are vulnerable to coercion by both types of elites, while small elites may be coerced by large elites and the latter are initially completely immune to coercion.

Finally, suppose that the degree of equality before the law |$rho in left[ 0.1right]$| Now parameterizes both the susceptibility of small elites to coercion by other smaller elites and the susceptibility of large elites to coercion by small and large elites. Under reasonable conditions (presented in Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2018), equality before the law increases when political power (i.e., Pareto weight) to smaller elites. The intuition is that, since small elites are already subject to the coercion of large elites, greater equality before the law increases the efforts of large elites more than those of small elites, making small elites more inclined to favor equality before the law. The second literature is on repeated games and community application. Much of this literature focuses on the threat of withdrawal of cooperation and ignores costly sanctions (Kandori, 1992; Ellison, 1994; Wolitzky, 2013; Ali and Miller, 2014).10 Some articles allow for costly sentences, with a primary focus on incentives for enforcers to serve sentences (Dixit, 2007; Masts and Examiners, 2014; Levine and Modica, 2016; Aldashev and Zanarone, 2017; Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2020). These documents do not examine the willingness of law enforcement officials to submit to punishment or equality before the law. The important thing is that the law is superior. All citizens must be equal before the law and subject to the laws of Australia. In addition to equality before the law, some aspects of the concept of the rule of law include the limitation of executive power – the sovereign must be bound by law – and the rule of law in conflict resolution.

It can be fruitful to analyse the interaction of these characteristics with equality before the law. Hayek (1960) also stresses the importance of the progressive development of the rule of law, an idea echoed by many legal philosophers such as Hart (1961); Another important area for future research is to examine the reasons for these gradual and evolving changes in the rule of law and, more generally, the reasons why laws conform to existing norms and customs. Finally, empirical analysis of the causes and implications of the emergence of equality before the law is another important area for further research. Powerful officials thus became equal to ordinary citizens before the law, a development with profound effects on public order|$ldots$| Athens has taken the first steps towards becoming a state governed not only by rules, but also by fair rules. (2015, p. 2015, p. 2015, p. 2015, p.

2015, p. 2015, p. 2015 151) Our latest comparative statistic states that a larger elite prefers a higher degree of equality before the law. This is consistent with the argument of North et al. (2009) that the first establishment of some degree of equality before the law in a broader segment of the elite (which we interpret here as an increase in the size of the elite) is an important condition for the subsequent extension of equality before the law to the entire population. Several cases of defensive modernization triggered by external threats illustrate our second important comparative static finding – the response of equality before the law to an increase in the return to effort. These cases also allow us to ignore other sources of social change, such as citizens` demands for additional rights or elites` responses to revolutionary threats.